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Abstract
We conduct a ﬁeld experiment on direct and indirect transfer mechanisms. It shows
that people are willing to donate signiﬁcantly more if the donation is indirect, i.e., it
is tied to the purchase of a good with a price premium, rather than made directly.
This points to an eﬃciency–eﬀectiveness trade–oﬀ: even though indirect donations are
less eﬃcient than direct donations, they are more eﬀective in mobilizing resources. Our
ﬁndings hold for ‘Fair Trade’ coﬀee as well as for ‘normal’ coﬀee. However, the strength
of the eﬃciency–eﬀectiveness trade–oﬀ is higher in the case of ‘Fair Trade’.
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1 Introduction
It is a long held tenet of welfare economics that – in the absence of external eﬀects – eﬃcient
transfers must not distort prices. In contrast, indirect transfers that are tied to economic
activities, such as subsidized producer prices, lead to overproduction and thus deadweight
losses. By the same logic, donations that are tied to an economic activity will give rise to
similar ineﬃciencies – the respective economic activity will exceed the level that is optimal
from a welfare perspective. For instance, donations may take the form of a premium over
the world market price that consumers are willing to pay for a particular product with the
premium going to some charity or to the producers themselves. This makes the donation
conditional upon production and sale of the goods. Instead of equalizing marginal production
costs and prices, producers will extend the production up to a point where marginal costs
equal price plus donation premium and thus produce too much compared to a situation in
which (the same amount of) donations were made directly. This results in excessive supply
and eventually a reduction of the world market price which runs counter to the intended
eﬀect. If the same amount of donations were given directly to the charity or the producers,
production decisions would be optimal and the charity or the producers would be better oﬀ.
Why then would it be in the interest of a charity to raise tied donations?
The development of the ‘Fair Trade’ (FT) movement raises this question forcefully: It
emerged from being a small scale operation, catering to a small group of developmental
activists, as a major player that now sells its products – initially coﬀee, tea, chocolate,
handicrafts, and now an increasing range of products – to the general public in supermarket
chains and canteens of large companies. "Global sales ﬁgures of Fair Trade products in 2006
are estimated to be in excess of (...) 2 Billion [Euro, authors] and Fair Trade continues to
grow at rates of 20 to 30 percent a year, with food sales in particular soaring" (IFAT (2006),
p. 6).1 Fair Trade organizations2 do rely on tied transfers. They sell their products at higher
than world market prices with the promise to remunerate producers ‘fairly’, i.e., better than
at going world market prices (Leclair (2002), p. 949).3
Given that many consumers are willing to pay this premium in order to support the
producers, why are FT organizations not seeking to obtain untied transfers, thereby avoiding
the allocative ineﬃciencies described above? Conversely, should other charities such as
the Red Cross or Save the Children adopt this business model? Are tied transfers
ineﬃcient, but more eﬀective? This is the concern of our paper.
In order to answer this question we conduct a ﬁeld experiment that compares the willing-
ness to donate through direct and indirect transfer mechanisms. In one treatment subjects
choose between ‘normal’ coﬀee and FT coﬀee, which is sold at a premium; in another treat-
1The amount of sales increased between 1999 and 2006 by 440 percent from 11.816 to 52.077 metric
tonnes, cf. http://www.fairtrade.net/coﬀee.html.
2SERRV (US), Oxfam (UK), GEPA (D), and Fairtrade (NL) are examples of FT companies in the West.
3FINE (2001), p. 1, deﬁnes: "Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialog, transparency and
respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development by oﬀering
better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and workers - especially in
the South."Introduction 3
ment subjects can buy normal coﬀee only (at the same price as in the ﬁrst treatment), but
are given the opportunity to make direct donations to producers of FT coﬀee. We can thus
compare the willingness to donate under both mechanisms. However, the willingness to pay
a premium in the ﬁrst treatment could be due to the appreciation of a perceived higher
quality of, or better production standards for FT coﬀee rather than the motive to donate
money to the producers.4 In addition, in the case of FT products, individuals may have a
preference to donate to poor producers through an increased price as they want to give them
what they regard a fair compensation for their work. They may regard direct donations
inferior to indirect – tied – donations as they consider the former charitable giving and the
latter a fair remuneration.5 This motivation refers to the way transfers are given to the
recipients, not the way they are raised, which is the concern of this paper.
To control for such possibilities we added a third and fourth treatment: In the third
treatment subjects could choose between the same two prices as in the ﬁrst treatment,
however for the same coﬀee; the price diﬀerence went to a charity project that beneﬁts
producers in the third world (but not particularly the producers of the consumed coﬀee).
The fourth treatment was the same as the second with the exception that the donations now
went to the same charity project as in the third treatment. The comparison of the two sets
of treatments allows us to assess the extent to which the special attributes of FT products
contribute to a higher willingness to pay for these products. In both setups it turns out
that the willingness to donate is substantially higher when subjects are oﬀered the indirect
donation mechanism compared to the direct donation mechanism. Thus the way in which
money is raised matters for the mobilization of resources. This points towards an important
eﬃciency–eﬀectiveness trade–oﬀ for voluntary transfers.
Our experiment is related to, but diﬀers in focus from, the empirical literature on giving
and altruism. Most empirical studies analyze the socio-economic determinants of individual
donations. For instance, Yen (2002) identiﬁes age, education and income as signiﬁcant
determinants for donations to charities, religious and other institutions, whereas household
size inﬂuences only giving for religious purposes. Duquette (1999) shows that marital status
and the existence of dependents is important. The level of urbanization and community size
is signiﬁcant in the study of Feldstein and Clotfelter (1974). Abrams and Schmitz (1984)
test for poverty and ﬁnd that donations are positively aﬀected by the level of neediness in
the residence state. For an overview see Schokkaert (2006).
Likewise, laboratory experiments have analyzed determinants of giving, mostly in the
framework of dictator games, in which a player decides about the distribution of a given
endowment between him/her and a second player.6 Eckel and Grossman (1998) ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant gender diﬀerence in giving. Framing eﬀects are also important: for instance
the lower the social distance to the other player, the higher the share allocated to him/her
4The ‘Fair Trade’ product standards include social, economic and environmental development
issues as well as labor standards. See http://www.fairtrade.net/ﬁleadmin/user_upload/content/
Generic_Fairtrade_Standard_SF_March_2007_EN.pdf for a detailed description.
5Economically such a tied transfer is still a donation if cheaper coﬀee of the same quality is available.
6See Camerer (2003), Ch. 2, for a survey.Design 4
[Charness and Gneezy (in press) , Brañas-Garza (2006b), Brañas-Garza and Espinosa (2006),
Bohnet and Frey (1999), and Hoﬀman et al. (1996), among others].7
Yet we are not primarily interested in the individual determinants of giving or sharing
as such, but rather in how the mechanism to transfer resources – direct vs indirect – inﬂu-
ences the willingness to give. The paper that comes closest to our own research question is
Brañas-Garza (2006a), who analyzes the dictator game in the laboratory under three diﬀer-
ent scenarios: the dictator (i) has no information about the second player, (ii) knows that the
recipient comes from a poor country and (iii) knows that donations will be sent as medicine
for poor recipients. The average donations account for (i) 10 percent, (ii) 66 percent and (iii)
80 percent, respectively, of the dictator’s endowment. Thus the willingness to give depends
on the neediness of the recipient, and also on the form that the transfer eventually takes
(monetary vs in kind). Contrary to Brañas-Garza (2006a), we study monetary donations
only and are interested in how the money is raised, rather than how it is given to the recip-
ients. Moreover, we conduct a natural ﬁeld experiment in coﬀee shops, which subjects visit
as part of their daily routine and where they spend their own money.8 The only change is
that they are now given a choice (to donate or not, to buy a diﬀerent coﬀee and/or to pay
a higher price) where they previously had none. We thus believe that our experiment can
provide some realistic insights in the diﬀerent inclination for (small) donations under direct
and indirect transfer mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the design of the
experiment, Section 3 examines the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Design
2.1 General Setup
We are interested in determining diﬀerences in the willingness to make small donations
through direct and indirect transfer mechanisms in a typical, realistic setting. Since FT
products are the most commonly known vehicles for small indirect donations, we chose cof-
fee, one of its main product, as donation vehicle for our experiment. As locations we chose
university coﬀee shops that are self-administered by student unions. In order to avoid diﬀer-
ent endowment eﬀects we selected only coﬀee shops that did not sell Fair Trade or organic
coﬀee prior to the experiment or collected any donations. Likewise, the price of a cup of
7A third somewhat related strand of literature from marketing science is concerned with the question
whether sales will increase if the product is combined with corporate philanthropy or a speciﬁc humanitarian
cause (Varadarajan and Menon (1988), Adkins (1999)). Strahilevitz (1999) and Strahilevitz and Myers (1998)
analyze which characteristics make a product suitable for donations to charities. They ﬁnd that ‘frivolous’
products lend themselves more easily to charity incentives than practical ones.
8On the potential biases in laboratory and ﬁeld experiments see Harrison and List (2004), Levitt and List
(2007) and the literature cited. Particularly relevant for our context is Benz and Meier (2006) who compare
individual donation behavior in laboratory experiments with the behavior of the same people in the ﬁeld.
They ﬁnd only a weak correlation ranging from 0.25 to 0.4 and frequently stark diﬀerences in behavior.Design 5
‘normal’ coﬀee was 50 Eurocent in all shops and the physical setting was similar.9 Beside
coﬀee, all shops sold other products such as non-coﬀee beverages. We found suitable venues
in Darmstadt, Hamburg and in two diﬀerent universities in Berlin so that communication
between the patrons of diﬀerent treatments was impossible. Unfortunately, it was not pos-
sible to ﬁnd coﬀee shops in which the clientele was academically homogeneous, i.e., in each
shop students of particular departments were overrepresented.10
We used the following protocol: Each coﬀee shop was sent a letter with instructions
(see Appendix A), which all sales persons were requested to read. The treatments were
conducted over a period of two weeks with observations recorded on Tuesdays, Wednesdays
and Thursdays. In the ﬁrst week the sales persons recorded the number of coﬀees and other
products sold at each particular day. These accounts serve as reference points, in order to
ﬁnd out whether the treatment attracted more people, which may result in biased samples
for the diﬀerent treatments. Fortunately this was not the case.11 In the second week the
treatments were implemented (see below) while normal coﬀee continued to be sold at the
regular price. We clearly marked the introduction of a new alternative (diﬀerent coﬀee
at higher price, donation box etc.) through signs and material provided by the respective
institutions (GEPA and MISEREOR) directly at the counter where the coﬀee was sold. Signs
and material were in all treatments of equal size and color, so that the level of awareness
and information about the new alternative was equal in all treatments. We used a standard
type of donation box which is used widely for charitable donations at counters or in street
collections and is easily recognizable as such.12 We speciﬁcally instructed all sales personnel
in all treatments not to proactively advertise the new alternative so that people were clearly
aware of the alternative, but did not feel pressured to opt for it.
On the last day of every treatment patrons were interviewed using a standardized ques-
tionnaire. The intention was to determine whether populations were comparable in their
socio-economic composition. Also we wanted to analyze whether individuals regarded Fair
Trade mainly as a means to donate or whether they associated speciﬁc product attributes
with FT coﬀee for which they might have the willingness to pay a premium. Interviews were
done only at the last day and only after the subjects had bought coﬀee, in order to avoid
inﬂuencing their future behavior in the experiment. Until this point patrons were not aware
9The endowment eﬀect describes a behavioral pattern in which individuals value a good more highly
when they are endowed with it and have to forego it than if they want to acquire it. Thus willingness to pay
for a good is regularly lower than the compensation that they require to forego the product, cf. Kahneman
et al. (1990). A related eﬀect could occur in our context: the number of people opting for FT coﬀee could
be higher if we introduced normal coﬀee at 50 Eurocent when they previously were oﬀered only FT coﬀee at
60 Eurocent compared to a situation in which people initially could buy only normal coﬀee at 50 Eurocent
and we introduced FT coﬀee at 60 Eurocent. We thus chose in all treatments the same baseline scenario of
normal coﬀee being sold at 50 Eurocent.
10In Darmstadt patrons were mostly from architecture and other technical ﬁelds, whereas in Hamburg
the coﬀee shop was located in the humanities building. The coﬀee shop at the Freie Universität Berlin was
mainly visited by students from social science and humanities while patrons at the Humboldt Universität
Berlin mostly studied economics either as major or minor.
11The Wilcoxon-signed-rank test rejects the null for each treatment, thus there is no signiﬁcant structural
diﬀerence in the samples.
12Three example settings are shown in Appendix B.Design 6
that we were conducting an experiment.13
2.2 Four Treatments
We conducted four independent treatments.14 The announcements were similarly designed,
except for the diﬀerences between treatments.
Treatment 1 (T1):
The consumer could choose between ‘normal’ coﬀee at 50 Eurocent and ‘Fair Trade’ coﬀee
at 60 Eurocent. This premium of 20 percent approximately reﬂects the price diﬀerence in
the market.15
Treatment 2 (T2):
Besides buying ‘normal’ coﬀee people could make a donation in a newly installed donation
box. The donation in this case was given to the most prominent FT organization in Germany,
GEPA, indicated by a corresponding sign "gepa - Das Fair Handelshaus" ("gepa - The Fair
Trade Company").16 This is the same company that produced the FT coﬀee used in the
ﬁrst treatment.
We cannot exclude the possibility that the willingness to pay a price premium for FT
coﬀee is not entirely, or even not primarily motivated by the wish to donate. Instead indi-
viduals could be willing to pay extra for the speciﬁc production standards under which Fair
Trade coﬀee is produced (cf. fn. 4), or for a perceived higher quality of FT coﬀee compared
to normal coﬀee. They could also regard the higher price as a vehicle to achieve a ‘fair’ re-
muneration for the producers’ work and thus prefer to channel the donation to the producers
through the indirect mechanism. Unlike the indirect donation mechanism they may regard
the direct donation mechanism as charitable giving and not a ‘fair’ remuneration. Some
might not even be aware of the donation component in the indirect mechanism. Likewise,
subjects might consider the FT company GEPA not as a charity, which would reduce the
inclination to put money in the donation box. These eﬀects would lead to a larger diﬀerence
between the indirect and direct donation treatment than is caused by the diﬀerent methods
to donate.
Therefore, we conducted a second set of treatments: We used ‘normal’ coﬀee as in the
ﬁrst treatment, sold at the regular price and in the third treatment also at the higher price.
This excludes diﬀerent product attributes as a reason to pay a premium. Moreover, we used
13This may be important as people aware of being part of an experiment may have a stronger self-image
or sense of identity and therefore behave diﬀerently, cf. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Levitt and List
(2007). Studying people’s behavior in their natural habitat without them being aware that they are under
study will avoid such – potentially large – biases.
14A pretest using the ﬁrst two treatments was run in Freiburg and Köln to check the setup. It showed
strong diﬀerences between direct and indirect donations. Results are disregarded due to a diﬀerent reference
price for a cup of coﬀee, i.e., 1 Euro.
15We used a middle class coﬀee of a well-known German roaster (Tchibo) as baseline, since all coﬀee shops
used middle class coﬀee prior the experiment. Hence, it is appropriate to relate the price of middle class
coﬀee to the price of FT coﬀee.
16Although ‘GEPA’ is not a charity as such and does not raise donations directly, it is the institution
which is widely known as the leading fair trade organization in Germany. Since ‘GEPA’ does not have a way
to accept donations, they oﬀered to donate the money to ‘MISEREOR’.Design 7
a well-known charity as recipient of the donations in both treatments in order to exclude
the second reason for a bias in the above treatments, namely that FT organizations may not
be seen as a charity and therefore direct donations may be low. Since the money went to
poor producers in general and not particularly to the producers of coﬀee that the subjects
were consuming, the third motivation – a fair remuneration of producers for the consumed
product – was absent as well. Thus we focus on the diﬀerent method of raising donations.
Treatment 3 (T3):
Participants could choose to buy the same ‘normal’ coﬀee at 50 Eurocent or at 60 Eurocent.
If they opted for the second possibility, the diﬀerence was donated to a MISEREOR relief
project for small-scale producers, including coﬀee producers, in a developing country.17
Treatment 4 (T4):
The fourth treatment is the same as the second, in which normal coﬀee is sold and a donation
box is installed, except that the donation goes to the same MISEREOR relief project as in
the third treatment.
A comparison between T3 and T4 will show a possibly diﬀerent inclination to donate
through indirect and direct donation mechanisms. Moreover, it will show whether a diﬀerence
in the donation vehicle has an impact on the amount of resources mobilized. A comparison
between T1 and T2 may show this as well, but results might be biased due to diﬀerent
perceived product attributes of FT coﬀee compared to normal coﬀee (see above). Such
a diﬀerence in the evaluation of the product will be shown by comparing T1 and T3. A
second bias may arise because people regard the FT organization GEPA not as a charity
and therefore are less inclined to donate directly. If that was true it would show up by
comparing T2 and T4. This is summarized in table 1.
Treatments T2 T3
T1 direct vs. indirect (incl. attributes) attributes (of product)
T4 attributes (of organization) direct vs. indirect
Table 1: Measured Eﬀects by Comparison of Treatments
We note that there is evidence that donations are more frequent and higher if others
can observe them compared to a situation of anonymity [e.g., Andreoni and Petrie (2004),
List et al. (2004), and Soetevent (2005)]. In a poorly designed experiment, this could lead
to a bias if the degree of observability was not uniform across treatments. For our case we
are conﬁdent that our results are not aﬀected by such a bias because public observability of
the act of donating was the same in all treatments: the donation was made in public and
could be observed by others only at the time it was made, but not afterwards. People could
observe the dropping of the coin in the donation box, likewise, they could overhear the order
for the fair trade coﬀee or the coﬀee purchased at a premium. Once the transaction was
17The donations went to the project P22302 of MISEREOR. For details of the project see their internet
appearance on http://www.misereor.de/Projekte.8492.0.html?&no_cache=1, "Haiti: Karibikparadies - vom
Winde verweht" ("Haiti: Caribbean paradise - Gone with the wind").Results 8
concluded there was no visible sign of the donation, nor was there any indication in any of
the treatments how many people had donated before. The donation box was intransparent,
so that the amount donated thus far could not be discerned, and there was no record of how
many people had opted for the more expensive coﬀee. Likewise people could not distinguish
FT coﬀee (T1) or other coﬀee purchased at a premium (T3) from regular coﬀee purchased
at 50 Eurocents once it was sold since cups, smell, color etc. were identical.
3 Results
Table 2 reports the sale statistics for all treatments for both subsequent weeks. For the ﬁrst
week, before the treatment was implemented, we record all sales of regular coﬀee and other
products. For the second week, the treatment week, we record again all sales of regular
coﬀee and other products. Additionally, for T1 we record the number of FT coﬀees sold at
60 Eurocents, for T3 the number of regular coﬀees sold at a premium price of 60 Eurocents
and for T2 and T4 we record the number of donations made in connection with the purchase
of regular coﬀee or other products. (No donation was made without any purchase.) We do
not observe the individual donation, but we have the total amount donated in each box.
In the indirect donation mechanism (T1 and T3) the amount of donation was restricted to
the price premium of 10 Eurocent. For the direct donation mechanism (donation box, T2 and
T4) the individual donation was not restricted and unobservable to us. In our context that
is of little consequence since we are interested in possible diﬀerences of the total amount of
resources mobilized per capita, which we do observe. We thus essentially compare diﬀerences
in per capita donations by comparing imputed distributions of standardized donations. For
the direct donation mechanism we compute how many people would have donated the same
total amount if indirect donations were restricted to 10 Eurocent as in the case of indirect
donations and use nonparametric tests to compare the mean of the distribution. We thereby
account for diﬀerent number of subjects in the four treatments.
For instance in treatment T2, a total of 6 people made a donation, which summed up to
3.00 Euros (cf. Table 2). That is a per capita donation of 50 Eurocent for those donating.
One donating individual did not buy coﬀee, but an other product, which we have to exclude
for reasons of comparison, because this person would not have had a chance to donate in the
indirect donation treatments 1 and 3. Thus we have a total donation of 2.50 Euros for the 5
people that donated and bought coﬀee. If each individual were restricted to a 10 Eurocent
donation, the sum of 2.50 Euros would have been achieved if 25 people had donated out
of the 281 people that bought coﬀee in that treatment. Thus, when comparing treatments
T1 and T2 we compare the actual distribution of treatment T1 with 71 people donating 10
Eurocent each through their FT coﬀee purchases at a higher price and 32 people buying
coﬀee at the cheaper price and donating nothing with the imputed distribution in treatment
T2, in which 25 out of 281 people donated 10 Eurocent (see Table 3). The analogical calculus
is done for treatment T2 (see below, Table 4).Results 9
Treatment 1




Tuesday 9 32 53
Wednesday 15 23 43
Thursday 8 16 19
Treatment 2




Tuesday 74 1 395 1
Wednesday 106 2 311 0
Thursday 101 2 360 0
Total amount donated 3.00 Euros
Treatment 3




Tuesday 5 10 6
Wednesday 8 2 1
Thursday 5 10 2
Treatment 4




Tuesday 76 16 1 1
Wednesday 46 13 10 1
Thursday 55 14 11 0
Total amount donated 5.40 Euros
Table 2: Sales Statistics of Treatments 1 to 4
A ﬁrst impression of the diﬀerent inclination to donate in the four treatments is given by
Figure 1. It denotes the share of people in each treatment that have donated the actual or
imputed donation of 10 Eurocent. There is a marked diﬀerence between direct and indirect
donation mechanisms which is larger for the ‘Fair Trade’ treatments (T1 and T2) than for the
relief project treatments (T3 and T4). This points to the existence of the biases described
above in Section 2.2.
Table 3 gives the actual and imputed distributions for treatments T1 and T2, respectively,Results 10
Figure 1: Donations per Treatment
between donation and no donation. The imputed distribution was generated as described
above. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in donation behavior between T1 and T2; Fisher’s
exact test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means at the one percent level of signiﬁcance.
The direct donation mechanism raises an average donation of 0.9 Eurocent whereas the
indirect donation mechanism commands a per capita donation of 6.9 Eurocent.
Donation T2 T1 Total
no 256 32 288
yes 25 71 96
Total 281 103 384
Fisher’s exact P = 0.000
Table 3: Test of Diﬀerence between T1 & T2
We ﬁnd the same qualitative result of a signiﬁcantly higher average donation for indirect
donations than for direct donations for treatments T3 and T4. Direct donations raise an
average of 2.4 Eurocent, indirect donations are on average 5.5 Eurocent. Again Fisher’s
exact test rejects the null hypothesis at a one percent level of signiﬁcance.18
18In treatment T4, a total of 45 people made a donation, which summed up to 5.40 Euros (cf. Table 2).
That is a per capita donation of 12 Eurocent for those donating. Two people did not buy coﬀee, but other
products, which we have to exclude for reasons of comparison described above. This results in a total
donation of 5.16 Euros for those who bought coﬀee. If each donation were restricted to a 10 cent, the sum
of 5.16 Euros would have been achieved if 52 people had donated out of the 177 people that bought coﬀee
in that treatment. Thus, we compare the actual distribution of treatment T3 with 22 people donating 10
Eurocent each through their coﬀee purchases at a premium and 18 people buying coﬀee at the regular price
with the imputed distribution in treatment T4, in which 52 out of 177 people donated 10 Eurocent (see
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Donation T4 T3 Total
no 125 18 143
yes 52 22 74
Total 177 40 217
Fisher’s exact P = 0.003
Table 4: Test of Diﬀerence between T3 & T4
Yet as mentioned above, people may not see Fair Trade companies as charities, because
they do not collect (direct) donations, but operate as ’normal’ companies. That may reduce
the willingness to donate directly and thus donations per capita could be lower in T2 than
in T4. In addition, one motivation for buying FT coﬀee at a premium may be perceived
diﬀerences in standards of production or in quality (T1 vs T3). The latter eﬀect would show
if the probability to donate was signiﬁcantly higher in T1 than in T3. T3 uses the same
normal coﬀee as prior to the experiment and thus there are no diﬀerent standards or quality
as a motivation to pay extra.19
Donation T1 T3 Total
no 32 18 50
yes 71 22 93
Total 103 40 143
Fisher’s exact P = 0.124
Table 5: Test of Diﬀerence between T1 & T3
There seem to be diﬀerences in the distribution, but Fisher’s exact test rejects the null only
at a 12% level of signiﬁcance, which is slightly above the normal signiﬁcance levels. Thus
we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal means.
Likewise, we test whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the direct donations to FT
organization GEPA and the MISEREOR relief project by comparing T2 and T4. Indeed,
direct donations to GEPA are signiﬁcantly lower than to the well-known charity MISEREOR,
as shown in Table 6. The null hypothesis is rejected at the one percent signiﬁcance level.
This ﬁnding indicates that Fair Trade is not seen as charity in the traditional sense and
therefore subjects are disinclined to donate directly; yet they seem to be more inclined to
purchase the more expensive FT coﬀee in T1 than the coﬀee sold at a premium in T3. In
19Theoretically the motivation to donate to coﬀee producers could diﬀer from the one to donate to produc-
ers in general. Yet it is not clear why consumers should have diﬀerent degrees of altruism towards diﬀerent
groups of poor producers in developing countries.Results 12
Donation T2 T4 Total
no 256 125 381
yes 25 52 77
Total 281 177 458
Fisher’s exact P = 0.000
Table 6: Test of Diﬀerence between T2 & T4
order to explore this issue further we asked 82 subjects at the last day of the respective
treatment "What do you associate with ‘Fair Trade’?" and asked them to check up to three
answers out of six answers given.20 Results are given in Figure 2. It turns out that most
Figure 2: Associations with Fair Trade
of the subjects associate ‘Fair Trade’ with development aid and standards of production;
a smaller share with donations and the ‘warm glow’ and a still smaller, but substantial
part with better quality (taste or health). In other words, a very signiﬁcant part of the
respondents associate FT with special product attributes (production standards or quality,
i.e., taste and health). This suggests that some of the willingness to pay a premium for FT
coﬀee may be attributed to the valuation of these attributes, rather than only by the wish
to donate to a group of people in need.
We tried to check whether the diﬀerent results were driven by heterogenous samples. As is
well-known charitable giving is aﬀected by gender, wealth and income, age, and other socio-
economic characteristics (for a short review of the literature see the introduction). At the last
20The questionnaire is available upon request. We asked for gender, number of semester, ﬁeld of study,
marital status, number of siblings, visits to developing countries, variables indicating the wealth status,
religiousness, as well as a number of attitudes. Lastly we asked what people associated with ‘Fair Trade’.
We did not survey the subjects over the entire duration of the experiment, but only after they had made
their decisions at the last day of the experiment, because we did not want to inﬂuence future behavior.Concluding Remarks 13
day we conducted a survey of the patrons in which we compiled the individual characteristics
that have been found to inﬂuence charitable giving. We ran the Mann-Whitney-U test
and the Kruskall-Wallis-H test, which test whether the samples are drawn from the same
population. If conﬁrmed, we are able to compare the results of each treatment with each
other. Fortunately, this was the case with the only exception of the ﬁeld of study (cf. fn.
10)21 and the number of semesters (where we encountered a large number of ties). We cannot
exclude entirely that results are aﬀected by this selection, even though students had the same
distribution of all other characteristics such as age, gender, wealth and religiousness.22 But
because the diﬀerence in the amount of donations are so marked between direct and indirect
transfer mechanisms and the subject pools diﬀered w.r.t. their ﬁeld of study in all four
treatments, we are conﬁdent that such a bias, if it existed, would not invalidate our results.
For treatments T2 and T4 the actual number of people who made a donation was smaller
than the imputed one, which indicates that individual donations were larger per capita than
the imputed ones (at 10 Eurocent). This raises the question whether we could have mobilized
more resources with the indirect transfer mechanism if we had chosen a diﬀerent premium.
Since we already obtain the result that the indirect transfer mechanism raises signiﬁcantly
more money than the direct one, our basic result would be unaltered if we did. We may
however underestimate the maximum diﬀerence – it may be even larger with an optimized
premium. We do not think that this is a big issue because we approximately used the actual
premium that we ﬁnd in the coﬀee market, which should have already been optimized by
the FT companies. Likewise, a willingness to donate an amount smaller than 10 Eurocent
cannot materialize in the indirect donation mechanism, but in the direct one. This might
bias results, however in the same direction.
4 Concluding Remarks
Our ﬁeld experiment has shown, for our setup, that people are willing to donate signiﬁcantly
more if donations are tied to the purchase of a good rather than made directly. We used
two sets of treatments; in both cases the ﬁnal recipients of the donations were small farmers
in the developing world. The ﬁrst set of treatments channeled the donation through the
‘Fair Trade’ organization, the second set of treatments used a well–known charity. Each set
consisted of one treatment, in which the donation could be made indirectly through a price
premium for a cup of coﬀee that went to the recipient organization, and another treatment
21This bias could not be avoided, as we had to ﬁnd locations with similar setups, the same coﬀee price and
no organic or Fair Trade coﬀee prior to the experiment. Moreover, the socio-economic proﬁle needed to be
the same and the coﬀee shops needed to be willing to cooperate. Under these restrictions, the optimal choice
were student coﬀee shops. These are almost always located in university buildings that host speciﬁc subjects
(humanities building, social science building etc.) so that the ﬁeld of study was diﬀerently distributed among
patrons of diﬀerent treatments. We tried to have homogenous groups of students, for instance only students
of humanities, but did not ﬁnd enough coﬀee shops that satisﬁed the other criteria and were willing to
cooperate. We also tried employee cafeterias in large department stores as locations, but the management
would not cooperate.
22Frey and Meier (2003) ﬁnd for the University of Zurich that students of business economics and natural
science give less on average than students of arts and letters.Concluding Remarks 14
with a donation box for the same organization at the counter of the coﬀee shop. The amount
of donations were signiﬁcantly larger when the indirect donation mechanism was in place.
Our ﬁndings are in line with earlier studies which show that framing matters a lot for
the decision to give to other people. Contrary to earlier studies, however, we show that
already the simple mechanism through which the money is raised is decisive for the amount of
resources mobilized for a certain cause. We ﬁnd that the less eﬃcient mechanism raises more
money than the eﬃcient one. Our ﬁnding points towards an important trade–oﬀ between
allocative eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. It may well be that a donation mechanism that is less
eﬃcient per dollar raised is preferable because it generates (so) many more resources. More
generally, an exclusive focus on allocative eﬃciency may in some situations create analytical
myopia as it overlooks a possible eﬃciency–eﬀectiveness trade–oﬀ. Donations to charity
certainly constitute such situations, but there may be important others as well.
We also show (at a twelve percent signiﬁcance level) that people are willing to pay
a premium for certain production standards and diﬀerence in quality. This implies that
monetary donations may be combined implicitly with a donation in kind (costly better
working conditions) in the indirect transfer mechanism. People are willing to donate more
with the indirect donation mechanism. Moreover, they are willing to give even more if the
product satisﬁes certain standards. They are also willing to pay even more if they know
that the donation beneﬁts the producers of the product they consume and thus produces
a ‘fair remuneration’ to them. Yet this additional willingness to pay for these two reasons
(diﬀerence in quality and production standards and preference to donate to the producers
of the product) is small compared to the diﬀerence in the willingness to pay that is created
by the mechanism through which the donation is raised: direct or indirect.
In our view the experiment raises two important questions. First, it is not yet clear to
what extent our ﬁndings generalize to other charities and philanthropic causes and to situ-
ations beyond individual philanthropy. Our research was motivated by the soaring sales of
the ‘Fair Trade’ organizations, which use the indirect donation mechanism as exclusive busi-
ness model, but our result holds for a diﬀerent charity as well. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that our ﬁndings are not limited to our speciﬁc setup. For example, the ‘Bauhaus Archive’
for design23 collects more than four times as much money through the sale of ‘overpriced’
chocolate than through a donation box at the entrance.24 Our ﬁndings suggest that other
charities and humanitarian causes may use indirect donation mechanisms to their advantage
as well, even if they come at the cost of reduced eﬃciency. It needs to be established which
characteristics make them most suitable for indirect transfers.
Second, we have shown that it may be rational for charities and other organizations rais-
ing money to use ineﬃcient indirect donation vehicles, because they are more eﬀective. The
reason for that rationale is that individuals behave diﬀerently from what simple economics
23The Bauhaus Archive is a non-proﬁt organization that runs a museum and an archive on Bauhaus designs
in commemoration of the group of artists, architects and designers in Germany that was founded in 1919
and dissolved by the Nazis, cf. www.Bauhaus.de.
24Telephone conversation with Ms. Seydell, Bauhaus archive, on 2007–01–09.Concluding Remarks 15
would predict. According to that view, normal individuals should be indiﬀerent between
donating through a price premium or donating directly; individuals understanding the inef-
ﬁciency of tied aid should prefer direct donations. Our experiment shows the opposite to be
true! People donate signiﬁcantly more if they have the choice to buy a product at a normal
price or the same product at a premium and to donate that premium than if they buy this
same product and have a box to donate. In our experiment we point out this behavioral
anomaly, show that it may be rational to exploit it and that this eﬃciency–eﬀectiveness
trade–oﬀ may be important for economic analysis, but we do not explain why people behave
this way. This is the next step.
It may turn out that the logic of gift exchange experiments extends to the mechanism
of donations. Falk (2007) shows that the frequency of charitable donations increased sig-
niﬁcantly when the solicitation letter was accompanied by a gift. More generally, people
are more inclined to make a gift if they get something in return. In our context people
may regard the purchased coﬀee as something received in return (for the donation plus the
ordinary price), and thus are more inclined to make the donation. They may not have the
same association when they buy coﬀee and make a donation in a box because these two
transactions are not as clearly linked. Whether this hypothesis stands up to closer scrutiny
is left for future research. If so, it would extend the applicability of the gift exchange logic
to a much larger range of individual interactions.Instructions for Sales Persons 16
A Instructions for Sales Persons
• Do not say anything about an experiment! Be as you normally are.
• The experiment is conducted over two weeks, on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday.
– In the ﬁrst week nothing changes, except that you ﬁll the tally sheet.
– In the second week the experiment is conducted and the tally sheet is extended.
• Be extremely careful when ﬁlling the tally sheet and do no mix up the columns in order
to record accurately sales of coﬀee, other products, donation and Fair Trade coﬀee.
• It is very important that you do everything meticulously and with a maximum of
accuracy.
• If you have to sell diﬀerent brands of coﬀee, it must be visible for consumers that they
get the coﬀee that they paid for.
• If a consumer is asking why you are doing this never say anything about an experiment.
– New coﬀee (T1): "It is a new coﬀee and we wanted to give you a choice."
– Donation box (T2 and T4) or coﬀee with donation premium (T3): "‘We wanted
to give you the opportunity to donate for this cause."
• Never open the donation box! If it is full you have to install another one.
• For T4 As you sell at diﬀerent prices, the whole amount donated through the higher
price must be donated for the mentioned purpose. Please provide a receipt. If you do
not want to donate it, give it to us and we will donate it.Experimental Settings 17
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